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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent

v.
FERMIN

MIERA, JR.

Case No. 18357

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Fermin Miera,.appeals from a conviction and
judgment of Burglary, a Felony of the Third Degree in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant, Fermin Miera, was charged with Burglary,
a Felony of the Third Degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-202(1) (1953 as amended).

He was convicted of the charge

in a jury trial and was subsequently sentenced to incarceration
at the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of 0-5
years.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction and judgment
rendered below and asks to have the judgment vacated and a
judgment of acquittal entered or to have the case remanded
to the Third Judicial District Court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On New Year's Eve, December 31, 1981, at about 1:53
a.m., a police officer saw broken windows on a downtown office
building and observed Appellant inside.

(T. 6)

Shortly thereafter,

an alarm sounded from the building and two more officers arrived
at the scene.

(T. 11,27)

Appellant was found alone inside

the building with a roll of stamps and a pen and pencil set
in his pockets.

(T. 16)

Three large rocks were found inside

the building in the office adjacent to the broken window.
19)

(T.

The stamps and pen and pencil were believed to have been

removed by Appellant from one of the offices in the building
(T. 18).

These stamps were returned to the owner of the building

(T. 25).

Prior to being found inside the building, Appellant
had consumed about 13 cans of beer, two bottles of wine and
had sniffed toluene throughout the course of the evening.
60-62)

(T.

Appellant testified that he was aware he entered the

building, but did not know why he entered (T. 64).
home (T. 63) and it was cold outside (T. 69).

He was heading

He had no intention
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of taking anything from the building (T. 65).

The officers

testified to Appellant's cooperative behavior and appropriate
responses to questions during the twenty minutes they were
with him in the building.

(T. 23,32,33,48,53).

Dr. Brian S. Finkle, Director of the Center for Human
Toxicology at the University of Utah, testified that the consumption
of the beer and wine caused Appellant to have a blood alcohol
of .17% (T. 89).

He further testified that toluene, a paint

thinner, along with the alcohol would add to the effects of
the alcohol (T. 91).

In Dr. Finkle's opinion, Appellant would

have been "seriously intoxicated".

(T. 89)

His eyesight,

ability to focus, judgment, short-term memory, motor coordination,
reaction time and manual dexterity would be "measurably impaired".
(T. 91)

At the same time, a person who develops a tolerance

for alcohol or solvents may not exhibit signs of impairment
and yet be under their influence.

(T. 90,93)

Appellant was convicted after a jury trial of Burglary,
a third degree felony, punishable for the indeterminate term
of 0-5 years at the Utah State Prison.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO GIVE
APPELLANT'S JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS.
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(4) (1953 as amended) provides:
The court shall not be obligated to
charge the jury with respect to an included
offense unless there is a rational basis
for a verdict acquitting the defendant
of the offense charged and convicting
him of the included offense.
There was a rational basis for a conviction of criminal trespass
in this case and the jury should have been instructed on the
lesser included offense of criminal trespass.

This Court recently

set forth an analysis of whether an offense is a lesser included
crime.

In State v. Hill, Case No. 18180 (November 1, 1983),

this Court outlined a principal test involving the statutory
language and a secondary test involving the evidence in the
specific case.

This analysis was essentially followed in an

earlier Utah case involving a request for a criminal trespass
instruction in a burglary case.

In State v. Baker, Case No.

18245 (September 21, 1983), this Court found that the evidence
in that ·case was insufficient to have required the trial court
to have instructed on a lesser included.
Unlike the Baker, case, each of the tests
this case.
t~espass

is met in

First, all of the pertinent elements of criminal

are part of the statutory definition of burglary.

Secondly, the circumstances of this case compel a conclusion
·that criminal trespass was a lesser included of the burglary
charge.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A

CRIMINAL TRESPASS IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
OF BURGLARY BY THE TERMS OF THE STATUTES.
Utah Code Ann. §76-l-402(3)(a) (1953 as amended) provides
that an offense is a lesser included offense when "[i]t is
established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged."
Utah's statutory scheme requires the court to compare the elements
of the offense.

If the greater offense necessarily involves

committing the lesser offense, then the lesser is an included
offense.
The statutes setting out the crimes of burglary and
criminal trespass are as follows:
Burglary. -- (1) A person is guilty
of burglary if he enters or remains
unlawfully in a building or any portion
of a building with intent to commit
a felony or theft or commit an assault
on any person. [Utah Code Ann. §766-202 (1) (1953 as amended)]
Criminal trespass. -- (1) For purposes
of this section "enter" means intrusion
of the entire body.
(2) A person is guilty of criminal
trespass if, under circumstances not
amounting to burglary as defined in
sections 76-6-202, 76~6-203, or 766-204:
(a) He enters or remains unlawfully
on property and;
(i) Intends to cause annoyance
or injury to any person thereon or damage
to any property thereon; or

-5-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(ii) Intends to connnit any crime,
other than theft or a felony;
(iii) Is reckless as to whether
his presence will cause fear for the
safety of another. [Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-205(1) and (2) (1953 as amended)].

The criminal trespass statute is intended to be a lesser
included offense of burglary.

The legislature even specified

that criminal trespass occurs "under circumstances not amounting
to burglary."

Although the criminal trespass statute sets

forth intentions other than the "intent to commit a felony
or theft or assault" in the burglary statute, an intent to
cause annoyance or to damage property [Utah Code Ann. §766-206 (2) (a) (i)]

or being reckless as to the fear caused by

the actor's presence [Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206(a)(iii)] are
of necessity included within the intent required under the
burglary statute.

One cannot intend to commit a felony, a

theft, or an assault without either intending annoyance or
damage or being reckless as to the reactions to his presence.
There is thus considerable overlap of the statutory elements
of the two crimes.
B

THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL SUPPORTED A LESSER INCLUDED
INSTRUCTION ON CRIMINAL TRESPASS.
In State v. Baker, supra, this Court recognized that
an instruction on a lesser included offense is appropriate
"if the evidence offered provides a 'rational basis for a verdict
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acquitting the appellant of the offense charged and convicting
him of the included offense."'
basis existed in this case.
was charged with burglary.

Id. at 10.

Such a rational

As here, the defendant in Baker
Police found him inside a gas station.

A lock had been broken off a desk drawer and the contents of

the desk were scattered.

Nothing was found missing.

The defendant

asserted that he was too intoxicated to form an intent to commit
a theft.

In affirming the lower court's refusal to give a

lesser included instruction, this Court held that there was
insufficient evidence to support the defendant's claim of intoxication
to a point of inability to form an intent.

This Court further

held that, even if the defendant could not form an intent,
it was proper to refuse a criminal trespass instruction where
intent is also required for the commission of that offense.

Id. at 11.
In this case, Appellant presented considerable

testi~ony

negating his capacity to form the intent to connnit any crime
while inside the building.

Appellant testified to his long

history of glue sniffing and alcohol consumption.

At the time

of the offense, he had been sniffing solvents for almost 20
years.

On the evening of the event in question, he had sniffed

toluene, a paint thinner, and he had consumed more than a dozen
cans of beer and two bottles of wine.

(T. 60-62).

He testified

that he was aware that he was in a building only because police
officers pursued him and that he did not know why he had entered
the building.

(T. 64)

He stated that he did not know if he

took anything from the building and denied having intentions
to remove anything (T. 65).

His recollection of the event
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was vague as to how he got into the building .. (T. 67-68)
Dr. Finkle testified to the influence of the alcohol
and toluene on Appellant.

Dr. Finkle estimated that Appellant's

blood alcohol was about .17% at the time of the event.
89)

(T.

The statutory presumption for for "under the influence"

requires a blood alcohol of less than half Appellant's (.08%).
Dr. Finkle described appellant's mental state as "drunk" or
"seriously" intoKicated".

(T. 89)

Dr. Finkle testified to

the effect of toluene enhancing Appellant's already intoxicated
mental state (T. 91).

Evidence of Appellant's extensive consumption

of alcohol and toluene supports the theory that he would have
been unable to form an intent as required by the burglary statute.
The evidence of intoxication is greater in this case than was
the evidence presented in Baker, supra.

It is still necessary,

of course, to show that criminal trespass was an appropriate
lesser included offense.
Appellant's conduct was reckless as to whether another
person would have been in fear for his or her safety.

Although

Appellant was unable to form a specific intent, he could act
recklessly.

While no one was in the business when Appellant

entered, he nevertheless acted with an awareness but disregard
of the risks to any potential persons inside the building.
Moreover, intoxication is no defense to a mental state of recklessness.
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-306 (1953 as amended).

Thus, Appellant's
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theory of his defense, that any intent was negated by his intoxication,
still supports a conviction of criminal trespass pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202(2)(a)(iii).

There would have been

a rational basis on which a jury could have returned a verdict
of guilty of the lesser irlcluded offense.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY THAT THE PROSECUTION MUST NEGATE THE
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-306 (1953 as amended) provides
that:
Voluntary intoxication shall not be
a defense to a criminal charge unless
such intoxication negates the existence
of the mental state which is an element
of the offense. . .
The trial court's instruction to the jury in this case defining
the defense essentially stated the statute.

The court refused,

however, to include the negation of this affirmative defense
as an element that the State must prove.

Appellant's proposed

instruction was rejected and the Court's Instruction No. 13
was given.
This Court specifically addressed the issue of the prosecution's
burden of proof when an affirmative defense is raised in State
v.Torres, 619 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980).

In Torres, this Court

reversed a conviction where the trial court failed to give
an appropriate instruction defining the burden of proof on a
defendant's affirmative defense of self-defense.

-9-
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the State argued that the instructions as a whole informed
the jury of the proper burden, this Court stated that "[i]t
seems neither fair nor necessary to expect or require the jury
to go through such a tortuous process when that result could
have been achieved by giving the defendant's requested instruction,
or one of that substance."

Id. at 696.

Although the trial court instructed the jury on the
burden of proof of defendant in raising an affirmative defense,
the failure'. ·to instruct the jury on the

State~

s burden ·'when

listing the elements that must be proved could easily have
misled the jury.

As in Torres, supra, the jury should not

have had to go through a "tortuous" process to define the burden
on the State.

The jury, presented with specific information

in Instruction No. 12 regarding intoxication,'.may well have
been confused by the trial court's failure to include a negation
of voluntary intoxication in Instruction No. 13.

They might

not have known how to apply the information on intoxication
to the chargeq offense of burglary.

Had they been given the

requested instruction, they could have applied their findings
regarding intoxication to the element of intent to commit a
theft and would have been guided more specifically as to
when

intoxication negated one of the necessary elements of

burglary.

-10-
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CONCLUSION
Failure of the trial court to grant Appellant's requested
instruction on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass
and instruction on the negation of the affirmative defense
of voluntary intoxication deprived Appellant of a fair trial.
For all of the reasons cited above, we urge this Court to reverse
the conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

DATED this~

day of November, 1983.

INDA E. CARTER
Attorney for Appellant

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing.to the Attorney General's
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah,
this

-:Ar-_~:·

day of November, 1983 .
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